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This paper discusses the possibility of strong employment protection in co-operatives 
(exclusion of dismissal) and of the imposition of a minimum wage equal for all worker 
members in worker co-operatives. It maintains that the worker co-operative has unique 
features in its ability to reach employment stabilization. It shows, both theoretically and with 
reference to existing empirical evidence, why and how worker co-operatives are able to 
overcome the lay-off of workers, strongly reducing employment fluctuation when compared 
to other organizational forms. The development of more thorough and radical regimes of 
employment protection and distributive justice fulfil satisfaction of basic needs, workers’ 
right to work and to keep the job position. While stricter constraints on layoffs can cause 
inefficiencies (e.g. make it more difficult to dismiss under-performing workers), they also 
serve an insurance function against unemployment, favor the accumulation of firm-specific 
human, relational and social capital, and can increase performance in the medium to long 
run. Voluntary resignation, not involuntary layoff would the dominant mechanism allowing 
allocation of labor resources to the most productive occupations.    
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1. Introduction  
This paper starts from the premise that the very concept of dismissal is problematic in worker co-
operatives, and may be incompatible with their associative nature. If members are worker-owners 
with equal duties and rights, dismissal is expulsion of a member by other members. Several 
arguments have been put forward, which show the difficulties that a worker co-op would encounter 
in trying and dismiss its own members. These arguments discuss the possible criteria used to 
dismiss redundant worker (e.g. seniority or last in first out; typology of contract; contractual 
position etc…). When dismissals are discretionary, the position of who is in charge to select 
workers to be dismissed is again problematic (selected on the basis of what criteria? By what 
coalitions? etc…). Also solidarity and positive reciprocity among workers (or the fear of possible 
future dismissal) do not advise dismissal (Jossa and Cuomo 1997). Moreover, the very existence of 
the possibility of dismissal is likely to engender contrasts between individual and groups of 
members, and organizational costs (losses of efficiency). Even if all these arguments are fairly 
aligned in pointing out the difficulties encountered by dismissal procedures in workers co-
operatives, none of them goes as far as stating that dismissals could or should be altogether banned. 
In this paper endeavored to take this further step starting from existing premises and literature.  
Coherently, this paper studies employment protection and minimum labor remuneration in worker 
co-operatives, understood as mutual benefit, membership based organizations (Birchall, 2010; 
Borzaga and Tortia, 2017). Since worker cooperatives are reported by theory and by several 
empirical studies to have job stability and job protection against the risk of layoff as one of their 
dominant objectives, sharply differentiating them from investor owned companies, the study of the 
working rules supporting employment protection in this kind of organization is particularly 
important. Literature putsemphasis on employment insurance vis à vis income insurance as one of 
the main objectives in worker co-operatives. While capitalist enterprises would ensure workers 
against the risk of income fluctuation by stabilizing wages, worker co-ops would be able to proceed 
one step further by guaranteeing not only income, but also employment to their members 
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(Myhazaki and Neary, 1983; Wong, 1983; Kahana and Nitzan, 1989; Albanese, Navarra and 
Tortia, 2019). This evidence shows lower propensity of cooperatives than investor owned 
companies to lay-off workers also during periods of crisis (Bartlett et al., 1992; Craig and Pencavel 
1992, 1995; Bonin, Jones and Putterman, 1993; Pencavel Pistaferri and Schivardi, 2006; Burdin 
and Dean, 2009). Empirical evidence and tests show that employment stabilization is mainly 
achieved through stronger fluctuation of labor income and hours worked in cooperatives (Navarra 
and Tortia, 2014; Navarra, 2016; Albanese et al., 2015, 2019).  
The pronounced tendency of worker co-ops to stabilize employment can favor an evolutionary 
pattern underpinning the emergence of Employment Protection (EP) regimes that are peculiar to 
the control rights and governance of this organizational form. EP can be achieved in the absence of 
legal constraints, as the result of implicit contracting between members and the organization. 
Members may accept lower and fluctuating wages in exchange for heightened job stability 
(Navarra and Tortia, 2014, Albanese, Navarra and Tortia, 2015). Alternatively, EP can be 
progressively made explicit and institutionalized, by working out rules that limit the possibility of 
layoff. This kind of regulation is found also in investor owned companies (IOFs), in cases in which 
layoffs are allowed only in specific circumstances (e.g. financial or economic crisis of the 
organization), or when they are subject to arbitrage or bilateral bargaining between firms and 
unions (Commons, 1950). In worker cooperatives, given the overlapping of roles between the 
employer (the organization) and employed workers (members), rules need to be tailored and 
adapted to the specific institutional set up. Also, the motivation underlining the emergence and 
development of EP regimes can be different in different organizational forms. In investor owned 
companies, EP is usually justified by the risk of unfair treatment, or discriminatory dismissal. In 
this case, EP is based on the necessity to protect workers from unfair and discriminatory decisions. 
EP has also been based on the argument that it favors the accumulation of human capital, since 
stability increases the incentives for both workers and employers to invest in training and long term 
adaptation of the workers’ competencies to organizational objectives. This way, job stability can 
match increased productivity of labor. Given the dual role of workers as members and employees 
in worker co-ops, the risk of unfair dismissal is expected to be comparatively lower in co-
operatives than in IOFs. On the other hand, the accumulation of firm specific human capital is 
expected to be crucial in co-operatives too. Since w worker members have a say in the strategies 
and employment policies of the organization, they are likely to favor policies that guarantee job 
stability. To support this preference, as job stability requires increased productivity, members are 
expected to invest in training and development of firm specific skills.  
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On the negative side, news concerning instances of exploitation, abuse of power and bad working 
conditions are, unluckily, not alien to worker co-operatives too. These facts point to the necessity 
to increase protection of workers’ rights and to better regulate managerial discretionary decisions. 
This paper introduces and discusses the possibility of strong employment protection in co-
operatives (exclusion of dismissal) and of the imposition of a minimum wage equal for all worker 
members in worker co-operatives.  
The main arguments in this paper starts from the observation that, in IOFs, employment protection 
may lead to exacerbating contrasting interests and inefficient outcomes, since excessive protection 
may lead to decrease effort contribution by workers and productivity. This problem is shown by the 
principal agent literature and in the efficiency wage literature, since control costs may increase 
when the possibility of dismissal is constrained by legislation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984). In co-operatives there is no distinction between the employing organization and 
its members, that is there is no distinction between principals and agents (Ostrom, 1990). In 
principle, this fact can forestall the increase of control costs even in the presence of employment 
protection, while, on the other hand, triggering a virtuous circle supporting heightened 
involvement, accumulation of human capital through practice and training and, eventually, 
increased productivity.  
Capitalistic enterprises cannot reach the same result, given the existence of contractual rigidities 
(especially wage rigidity), and contractual failures (due to abuse of power, asymmetric information, 
and contrasting interests). Wage rigidity is a dominant feature of labor contracts in capitalist 
enterprises, its reported negative consequences on efficiency notwithstanding. Among the several 
theories striving to explain wage rigidity in capitalistic enterprises, especially relevant in this paper 
are: (i) implicit contracting. Risk neutral employer would insure risk averse workers by 
guaranteeing fixed wages in exchange for control rights over the labour process, implying control 
over the workers’ labour power. Knight (1921) introduced the idea of worker risk aversion, while 
implicit contract theory connected risk aversion to wage rigidity (Azariadis 1975; Azariadis and 
Stiglitz 1983; Baily 1974). By the same token, in Stiglitz (1975) worker risk aversion explains wage 
rigidity in the principal agent framework; (ii) in the presence of asymmetric information and 
contrasting interests in the agency relation between employer and employee, if wages were flexible 
and state dependent, the employer could behave opportunistically by exploiting information 
advantages and contractual power in order to lower wages, intensify work effort, and make the 
worker bear the negative consequences of his/her choices (Commons, 1950; Ben-Ner 1988; 
Screpanti 2001; Dow 2003, 2018; Navarra and Tortia, 2014; Albanese et al., 2015, 2019). In turn, 
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wage rigidity prevents the implementation of strong EP regimes in capitalistic enterprises, since 
costs cannot be adequately reduced during downturns. More on this in the following sections. 
In regulatory terms, several solutions can be envisaged to manage redundancies in cooperatives, of 
which three appear to be the most prominent: (i) the cooperative accounts for members’ 
preferences concerning job stability, and then unilaterally and discretionally takes decisions 
concerning layoffs. This is the most widespread solution observed to date; (ii) a process of 
arbitration in which the organization and its membership (or their representatives) interact, either 
alone or in the presence of a third independent party (e.g. government officials) to decide about 
layoffs; (iii) employment protection regulation, which externally regulates layoffs, as it happens in 
the case investor owned companies in several countries.  
After discussing some relevant examples, especially layoffs in the Mondragon group of worker co-
operatives in the Basque regions of Spain, and the Italian employment protection legislation, this 
paper focuses on a fourth, more radical, possibility. Indeed a purely hypothetical one, since it is not 
detected to date in any existing or existed worker co-operative or group of co-operatives. This 
solution is embodied in the exclusion of involuntary layoff in worker co-operatives, with the 
exclusion of disciplinary cases (misbehavior). In other words, in this hypothetical solution, only 
voluntary resignation, but not involuntary dismissal is allowed in worker co-operatives.1 Less 
radical solutions (partial exclusion of layoffs) can been envisaged as intermediate solutions 
between the complete exclusion of layoffs and absence or regulation.  
The importance of such a radical EP regime rests with its potential to fully protect worker-
members’ rights, and with the possibility to evaluate its consequences on the efficiency and 
performance of cooperatives. It also makes it possible to compare the potential of employment 
protection in cooperatives with existing EP regimes both in cooperatives and in investor owned 
companies. While the radical nature of the solutions proposed pose important and difficult (maybe 
unmanageable) challenges, its simplicity favors accuracy of analysis and the possibility to clearly 
derive and discuss expected outcomes. It can also serve as benchmark for mixed and intermediate 
solutions. Furthermore, its clear cut implications can serve as the starting point for further research.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: after the introduction, Section 2 introduces two 
relevant examples of employment stabilization solutions in worker co-operatives and in investor 
                                                             
1 This paper does not deal with employment protection regimes in other co-operative typologies (consumer, credit, user, 
producer co-operatives etc…).  
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owned companies. In Section 3, the central argument of the paper discusses the consequences on 
labor productivity and wage dynamics of restrictive employment protection regimes in worker co-
ops. Section 4 discusses the economic nature and contractual position of self-employed workers vis 
à vis worker members in co-operatives. Section 5 deals with the main theoretical implications of 
the new legal constraints. Section 6 hosts the discussion of the main arguments, especially 
concerning the nature of the new legal constraints, and the differences between members and self-
employed workers. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Examples: Mondragon in Spain and the Italian Employment protection 
legislation 
Two relevant examples of employment stabilization solutions in worker co-ops and in capitalistic 
enterprises are discussed in this section. The first deals with the Mondragon group of worker co-
operatives in the Basque regions of Spain, the second with the Italian labor legislation in the period 
spanning from 1970 (year in which the so called “Statute of the Workers” was passed) to 2015 
(year in which this EP regime was largely dismantled).  
In Mondragon, the well-known group of worker co-ops was created from scratch in the 50ies of last 
century and grew first nationally, then internationally and globally to the present day dimension of 
about 80 thousand employed workers, most of whom are members of the co-operatives. The 
number of layoffs of members since the inception of the initial co-operatives in 1954 has been close 
to zero, and extremely limited also during the severe economic and financial crisis that hit Spain 
over the last decade (between 2008 and 2014) (White and White, 1991; Arando et al., 2010). 
Spanish legislation, however, does not prevent co-ops from laying-off workers. Hence, this result 
has to be considered as the outcome of implicit contracting between workers and the co-operative, 
in which workers can accept lower and more fluctuating wages in exchange for guaranteed lifelong 
employment. In this case, the success of implicit contracting in stabilizing employment is supported 
by the convergence of objectives between members and the organization, since members’ demand 
for stable employment is compensated by the benefits accruing to the organization in terms of 
accumulation of firm specific human capital and competencies and by increased productivity. 
During downturns of demand, wages can be reduced and reserves of captal used as insurance funds 
to guarantee employment stability for members (Arando et al., 2010). 
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The importance of EP regimes is testified by the dedicated and detailed legislation that regulates 
workers’ rights and dismissals in conventional enterprises in most all countries. Italy introduced in 
1970 strict legal rules constraining the possibilities for employers to layoff workers (law 300/1970, 
the so called “Statute of the Workers”). The Statute is still in force today, but was largely amended 
by successive reforms in 1997, 2001, 2012 and 2015, resulting in the liberalization of the labor 
market between 2012 and 2015. Most constraints limiting layoff have now be lifted. Between 1970 
and 2012, unrestricted and discretionary dismissal was outlawed, while the law regulated the 
possibility of layoff for all firms employing more than 15 workers. Restrictions concerned unfair 
dismissals, layoffs for economic reasons, severance payments, minimum notice periods, 
administrative authorization for dismissals and prior discussion with representatives of unions 
and/or labor market administrations. Employees could be laid off only for “fair cause” and 
“justified motivation” (Spataro, 2018). Discriminatory layoffs (for gender, ethnic, political, 
religious reasons) were outlawed and would have led to reinstatement of the worker in his/her job 
position by the Court of Labor. On the other hand, layoffs for economic reasons were allowed, but 
only after the employer had produced suitable accounting evidence concerning the negative state of 
the organization, and agreed on the terms and conditions of layoffs with workers’ representatives. 
Finally, disciplinary layoffs were allowed only based on the capacity of the employer to produce 
suitable objective evidence concerning the worker’s misbehavior, and the Court of Labor could 
have and indeed often would reinstate the worker in his/her job position, were this evidence 
considered insufficient or flawed.  
This kind of strong job protection resulted in stabilization of employment for most workers, 
reducing both inflows and outflows from employment and from the labor market. It further resulted 
in reduced turnover and stabilization of job positions over the lifetime of workers at the micro level. 
On the negative side, it resulted in the emergence of a dual labor market in which the category of 
the protected workers was counterbalances by a growing layer of unprotected workers employed on 
fixed term contracts, occasional work, part time and other “atypical” contractual forms. The system 
of EP created by the Statute was repeatedly accused to have lowered productivity (Ichino and 
Riphahn, 2005; Vindigni, Scotti, and Tealdi, 2013), and to have represented an obstacle to lowering 
unemployment, especially among the young and women, by dampening incentives for firms to hire 
additional workers (Bertola, Boeri and Cazes, 1999, 2000). In this case, not implicit contracting, but 





3. Working rules: economic effects of employment protection in worker co-
operatives 
The main premise for the complete exclusion of involuntary dismissal of members in worker co-
operatives is that members hold control rights (are owners). Membership rights as control rights 
over the co-operative are understood as subjective (non-saleable) rights of the individual worker 
(Ellerman, 2016). They imply the right to keep one’s own job position (the impossibility to 
separate the owner of the right to manage from his/her job position) in all but a restricted number 
of cases (that have to do with worker proven misbehavior).  
This proposed constraint guaranteeing members against discontinuation of their job position can 
also be seen in relation to a similar right that accrues to the position of stockholders as owners of 
capitalist enterprises. In much the same way in which stockholders cannot be forced to sell their 
stock against their own will, worker members in co-operatives could not be forced to leave their 
job position against their own will. As no owner of any economic asset can be forced to abandon or 
sell it against his/her will, the prohibition to forcefully oblige stockholders to relinquish or sell their 
shares in corporations is meant to protect their ownership rights. So would be meant the prohibition 
to force worker members to abandon their work position in worker co-ops. 
From a different viewpoint, a job position in a worker co-operative is aimed at fulfilling workers’ 
needs, especially survival and reproduction needs, which are satisfied by the payment of a wage, 
and also security needs, which would be satisfied by securing the stability of the job position to the 
worker. This perspective is clearly coherent with Maslow (1943) human psychology, and the 
theory of the hierarchy of needs, in which survival and security needs occupy the two most 
fundamental layers and represent the most “prepotent” needs.    
3.1. Consequences on productivity 
Radical solutions concerning the EP regimes of the kind proposed in this paper are likely to be 
countered by severe criticism, which calls for deep scrutiny and discussion. The acceptance of 
restrictive EP regimes is clearly problematic in capitalism entrepreneurs because of a long list of 
reasons. Such regimes are perceived as: (i) crippling business freedom and independence; (ii) 
leading to inefficient production due to reduced control over workers and lower productivity; (iii) 
impeding efficient allocation of the labor input (workers freely moving from less to more 
productive occupations); (iv) implying weaker incentives for employers to hire workers; (v) 
implying cost increases and rigidities (limitation of dismissal would increases workers’ contractual 
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and pressure power over the employer; (vi) making cost reduction during negative economic times 
more difficult. Consequently, at no time and in any place has the strict prohibition of dismissal 
been considered a viable option in capitalist systems.  
The crucial next step in the argument would ask if similar problems are encountered in worker 
cooperatives and if this organizational form may be able to overcome such problems differently 
from capitalist enterprises. In co-operatives, the strict prohibition of lay-off can appear appealing in 
view of guaranteeing workers’ rights, and co-operatives can get closer than capitalist corporations 
to the possibility to restrict layoffs when it is considered that they are characterized by stronger 
flexibility in wages and our worked, and that they show stronger spontaneous tendency not to lay-
off workers even during economic crisis (Craig and Pencavel, 1992, 1994; Bartlett et al., 1992; 
Bonin, Jones and Putterman, 1993; Pencavel, Pistaferri and Schivardi, 2006; Burdin and Dean, 
2009; Navarra and Tortia, 2014; Albanese, Navarra and Tortia, 2015, 2019). These two 
fundamental features favor the possibility of stronger EP in co-operatives, and the possibility of 
detecting an evolutionary pattern specific to worker co-operatives that would further differentiate 
them from capitalist companies. Besides guaranteeing workers’ rights, stricter employment 
protection can strengthen incentives to accumulate human capital, since the additional 
remuneration (quasi rents) derived from additional investments would be less likely to be 
dissipated by layoffs. Expected losses would only be due to the risk of bankruptcy of the 
organization and to voluntary turnover (e.g. retirement), and not to involuntary dismissal.  
On the positive side, trial and error, cumulative process can emerge in which increased 
employment protection is paid-off in the medium to long run by increased productivity. On the 
negative side, strong employment protection can be criticized on the ground that  the ban on 
dismissal would reduce labor productivity as it would eliminate the expected cost of dismissal, 
hence the deterrence effect or disincentive to not engage in morally hazardous behaviors 
(inefficiently low effort contribution, misalignment of individual behavior with organizational 
objectives etc…). The answer to this accusation includes several elements. 
First, even in the absence of high expected costs of dismissal, the expected cost of bankruptcy or in 
any case of the economic crisis of the organization would still be clearly perceived by  worker 
members. If workers engage sub-optimally in the production process, the performance of the 
company deteriorates. Given the close link between wages and company results in work co-ops 
(wages in worker coops are not contractual remuneration, but shares of residual earnings), the 
worsening of performance would imply a reduction in labor income, leaving workers’ demands 
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unsatisfied. In extreme cases, decreased productivity implies insolvency and loss of employment. 
Loss of efficiency in collective action is clearly a prisoner’s dilemma like situation (Olson, 1965; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Ostrom, 1990). However, worker co-ops replace the vertical control 
with the horizontal control in terms of peer pressure, and co-operative governance evolves in ways 
that are coherent with sustaining adequate efficiency in collective action (Bowles and Gintis, 1987, 
1993, 1998). In order to prevent losses in income and employment, rational workers would strive to 
achieve an adequate degree of coordination, implying adequate monitoring and sanctions (Ostrom, 
1990; Borzaga and Tortia, 2017; Tortia, 2018). The creation and development of working rules and 
governance structures is crucial in guaranteeing the achievement of efficient and effective 
production (Commons, 1950; Ostrom, 1990; Hansmann, 2013; Borzaga and Tortia, 2017). 
Second, also the expected economic value of the job itself to workers can favor increased active 
participation in the production process and increased productivity. This value would increase 
following the longer expected stay in the organization, and lower expected costs of layoff The 
exclusion of dismissal would entails the maximum possible incentive to invest in training (on and 
off-the-job) and in human capital accumulation. Relatedly, social capital and trust can contribute to 
further lower transaction costs, improve expectations, and support the development of the 
organization. Workers would also have the maximum possible incentive to get actively involved in 
the production process and to be loyal to the organization. Indeed, studies in human resource 
management clearly show the job security is ranked very high among preferred objectives of 
workers and among contractual features (Guest 2007; Depedri, Carpita, Tortia, 2012). 
Criticisms concerning costs are crucial as well, since strong EP regimes can prevent cost reduction 
and restructuring during downturns. Wage flexibility represents one first answer to this criticism, 
which proved to be affective in many co-operative crises (Roelants et al., 2012). As the severity of 
the crisis increases, as better explained in the following section, voluntary resignation (due to too 
low wages) would intervene as dominant mechanism restoring organizational equilibrium and 
favoring the reallocation of resources (human and non-human) from less productive to more 
productive occupations).    
3.2. Wage dynamics 
The strong link between wages and company results in worker co-ops, on the one hand, and the fact 
that dismissal is excluded, on the other, would have a radical impact on wage and turnover 
dynamics. In general terms, wages are pro-cyclical in worker co-ops (increase and fall following 
demand and cost shocks) more than in capitalistic enterprises. This general feature of co-operatives 
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can be and is often attenuated by set a minimum wage for all workers. Co-oops can, and indeed do 
often choose to stabilize the level of wages in normal economic conditions by setting quasi-fixed 
wages, while end of the year results and reserves of capital are left to absorb cyclical shocks.2  In 
the framework developed in this paper, a minimum wage level equal for all workers would have the 
function of satisfying workers’ basic needs in the same way for each individual worker. On the 
other hand, co-operatives can also decide to differentiate wages above the minimum in order to 
align income with productivity. This way, co-operatives can be able to achieve at one and the same 
time two fundamental objectives: workers’ right to a fair income satisfying their needs, and 
remuneration on the basis of desert.  Economic mechanisms, in the absence of dismissal of workers, 
need to guarantee stability, especially during negative economic phases. In such negatives 
instances, if the organization is forced to reduce labor costs, all wages can be cut down 
proportionally to the minimum level, later to return to the initial level when the economic 
conditions of the organization improve.3 Even when all wages are reduced to the minimum level, 
only voluntary resignation would be allowed. When available resources do not even allow to pay 
the minimum wage, co-ops, before chasing operation, can still reduce the minimum level of the 
wage itself, this way favoring employment reduction through voluntary exit. Wage reductions lead 
more experienced and talented workers (who have better outside options) to voluntarily quit the co-
operative. Other workers may quit voluntarily when the wage paid goes below their participation 
constraint (reserve wage), because of the existence of unemployment subsides, or of preference 
given to self- employment, self-production and consumption, or other economic or financial 
resources. This way, the dimension of enterprises in bad economic conditions would shrink without 
the need to resort to involuntary layoffs and labor would be reallocated from less to more 
productive occupations. This process would to the disappearance of less productive organizations 
even in the absence of involuntary layoffs.  
In the absence of dismissals, negative economic phases can imply that the co-operative is required 
to paying a wage to all worker members even in the presence of redundancies. This can lead to 
inefficient allocation of wage funds. On the other hand, paying redundant workers shows that the 
co-operative works also as an insurance fund in which all workers, upon becoming members and 
                                                             
2 Wage stabilization appears to be the dominant solution in most countries. Italian co-operatives are reported to set 
constant wages, and to use end-of-the year residual and collective capital reserves, to absorb negative shocks (Euricse, 
2015).  
3 Reserves of capital (locked assets) can be used to prevent the minimum wage from falling too much. To this hand, the 
organization can run temporary losses 
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subscribing the co-operative social contract, accept to subsidize redundant colleagues during 
periods of crisis. This choice is made under the veil of ignorance, since at the moment of 
subscribing the co-operative social contract members have limited or no information concerning the 
future conditions of the organization and the probability (expected costs) of becoming redundant. 
Consequently, it may be rational for each worker to accept this subsidization constraint (Sacconi 
and Tortia, 2019). Subsidization of redundant workers can also have virtuous macroeconomic 
effects: by preventing layoff and by distributing fairly the resources that are left over during crisis, 
this mechanism would prevent aggregate consumption to fall and to aggravate the negative side of 
the business cycle. Macroeconomic fluctuations are exacerbated by job losses and increased 
unemployment, which are common outcomes when workers can be laid off without restraints. 
Following the above, we can state that co-operatives would be able to achieve at one and the same 
time two fundamental objectives. On the one hand, they can be able to guarantee (except in the case 
of bankruptcy) the fulfilment of the basic needs of the whole workforce. On the other hand, they 
can remunerate properly better educated and productive workers through the implementation of 
suitable incentive scheme including wage increases and career progress. The working of incentives 
can the tight and mimic the working of markets (especially the labor market), without violating 
internal constraints guaranteeing minimum remuneration to all workers. Wage dynamics would 
change dramatically when compared to the present day situation, since employment and minimum 
wage are not guaranteed at one and the same time in investor owned companies.  
To conclude this section, it is important to underline that the criticism stating that the exclusion of 
dismissal would reduce the incentive to invest in professional growth and human capital has been 
shown to be misplaced. Workers with high skills, experience and competence would enjoy much 
better opportunities for professional growth inside the organization, and better outside options for 
new occupations in the event of a crisis and plummeting wages. Less qualified workers would face 
decreasing wages without the possibility to find alternative occupation, the more so as the more 
qualified workers quit. Professional level, training and human capital would be all the more 
important in guaranteeing the efficient working of organizations and markets, and incentives to 
accumulate human capital and retrain would not be reduced. 
 
4. Self-employed workers 
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Not all workers can or want to be members of a cooperative. Some workers may simply prefer to 
remain independent rather than become partners. Professionals are an example, but there are several 
other types. On the other hand, cooperatives cannot be forced to associate a worker if they do not 
want. The process of associating a new worker is entirely voluntary and bilateral. It cannot be 
imposed on one of the two parties. In presence of strong employment protection constraints, the co-
operative may simply lack sufficient resources to associate a worker in a medium to long run 
perspective. Or, a specific worker can have characteristics and expertise that are not aligned with 
the objectives of the organization Members’ heterogeneity has been reported to be one of the main 
sources of inflated organizational costs. This fact may induce co-operatives to privilege the 
association of workers similar to the incumbent ones, and to limit intra-organizational heterogeneity 
(Hansmann, 1996, 1999).  
Consequently, the idea has to be accepted that part of the workforce may not be part of the 
membership, and would need to interact with the co-operative on different contractual premises. 
Non-member workers represent a widespread phenomenon in existing co-operatives, and they are 
usually likened to workers employed on fixed term contracts, but also open-ended positions do 
exist. Such worker are usually paid a fixed salary. The empirical literature shows that contractual 
(not associated) workers are laid-off more often than co-op members, and can share some, but 
usually not all the prerogatives attached to membership positions (Gago et al, 2012). 
Less traditional solutions can be imagined, though. Non-member workers can be likened to the 
“self-employed", or independent workers that interact with the firm on the basis on bilateral 
contracting. (Screpanti, 2001; Jossa, 2014). The weaker contractual party (the self-employed 
worked) may need to be granted contractual guarantees (e.g. imposition of a minimum wage paid to 
the self-employed), but the basic principle of independent parties freely interacting on contractual 
basis would   hold. In our framework, the most important and specific difference between 
associated and self-employed workers is that, while associated workers cannot be laid-off, contracts 
with independent workers can be discontinued or terminated (unilaterally or bilaterally by both 
parties) at any time. This follows directly from the definition of the two categories.  
Not only disadvantages (possibility of termination of the contract), but also advantages can be 
envisaged for the self-employed category. First, the salary of self-employed workers is not 
constrained by internal distributive dynamics, and can exceed the wages of associated workers. 
Quite clearly, stronger uncertainty of employment stability and variability of income streams can be 
monetized in terms of higher average wages for the self-employed. Independence would imply that 
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a company would have lesser control over self-employed workers than it has over employees. In 
turn, limited control over the self-employed would strengthen the incentive for co-ops to associate 
new workers in order to increase their integration into the production process and governance, this 
way reducing likely-to-emerge contractual costs with the self-employed. Independence implies that 
self-employed workers would no longer be tied, in terms of economic dependence and exclusivity, 
to one specific company like employees in capitalist companies, but could (but would not need to) 
operate as independent entities and, for example, work with more than one company at one and the 
same time. Many SE workers would choose to work for a single company because of the need to 
specialize and create firm specific human and relational capital, but this would not be an obligation 
any more. The possibility to work for more than one organization at one and the same time would 
represent an indirect incentive for co-operatives to associate as many workers as possible to 
increase their loyalty to the organization. For example, incentivizing investments in firm-specific 
human capital and competencies would be likely to require the conversion of an independent 
worker into a member. 
Another potentially important implication is that, being independent producers, the self-employed 
could create at any time new co-ops among themselves. New co-ops created would be start-ups that 
may not have, in the initial phases of their existence, fixed capital and a patrimony. They would 
exclusively rely on labor power. Disadvantages deriving from under-capitalization may be counter-
balanced by stronger contractual power in bargaining with the parent co-operative. The possibility 
for the self-employed to create new co-operatives by simply associating while their contractual 
relation with the parent co-op is still in force could, again, create an incentive for the parent co-op to 
associate new members and reduce the numbers of the self-employed. That is, in order to avoid the 
danger that the SEs create a new co-op, which can have strong bargaining power, the parent co-op 
would be induced to reduce as much as possible the incidence of the self-employed present in its 
premises. This incidence would be different in each co-op, depending on several dimensions, on 
both the demand and supply sides, but different contractual forms for the self-employed could 
differently impact on it.  
Finally, the category of the self-employed would also have the function of representing a 
"benchmark" for cooperative members, that is, it would represent the relevant "outside option". 
Members in co-ops could at any time compare their position with that of non-members in 
occupations with similar characteristics. Higher wages for the self-employed could be compared 
with stronger job protection, income stability and involvement in decision making for members, 
implying the choice to stay or opt out of the membership position. In general terms, the SE have a 
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systemic regulatory role, because they represent the fundamental pre-social (atomized) condition 
from which all members arrive and to which they can go back. The implicit or explicit comparison 
between the condition of the SE and that of the member would exert pressure on members to 
improve self-organization and internal governance, since internal organization must be able to 
guarantee a level of well-being at least equal to the SE condition. 
The presence of SE workers does not diminish the importance of the association of workers in co-
operatives. In fact, scale economies, transactional advantages and integrated production 
technologies represent sufficient conditions for making the membership condition a better 
alternative to working as a self-employed worker in a wide range of occupations.  
 
5. Theoretical implications 
This proposal is addressed to worker cooperatives only, not to other forms of business, because only 
in worker co-ops the worker-members have full control over the management and governance of the 
company and are therefore in the best position to modulate wage dynamic optimally with respect to 
the company's economic results. They are also accountable for their choices concerning wage 
dynamics. Different choices can lead to higher or lower wage dispersion, to higher or lower 
turnover, and to higher or lower probability of bankruptcy (e.g. a too high minimum wage for the 
whole membership implies higher risk of default). Since there are no conflicting interests between 
property and workers (the enterprise does not maximize profits by lowering wages), the problems 
coming from information asymmetry and abuse of power are dampened (Navarra and Tortia, 2014; 
Albanese, Navarra and Tortia, 2015, 2019). Strong wage fluctuation, as observed in worker co-ops, 
is not applicable to capital companies. In capitalism, moderate and intermediate forms of worker 
representation, like German co-determination, can be observed, but not radical forms like in co-ops. 
Such radical differences imply that dedicated legislation can be developed to regulate co-ops 
differently from capitalist companies. This work goes in this direction, by submitting that labor 
relations and contracts can be regulated in radically different ways in the two organizational forms.  
5.1. Isomorphism 
However, the regulation of wage and employment dynamics in co-operatives and capitalist 
companies did not follow the route of differentiation over the last decades in most countries. On the 
contrary, legal regulation has tailored to the features and needs of capitalist companies while, in 
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most cases, regulation of co-operatives followed an isomorphic pattern, with minimal 
differentiation relative to capitalist companies. Regulation appears to have accepted the logic of  
structural isomorphism, which makes organizations similar, but not necessarily more efficient, 
under competitive pressure and bureaucratization, (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). Organizational 
isomorphism can be contrasted by evolutionary forces supporting institutional evolution in the 
direction of differentiating the institutional structure of different organizational forms. In most 
cases, however, dedicated co-operative legislation has not counteracted isomorphism derived from 
bureaucratization and competitive pressure.  
Di Maggio and Powell (1983: 157) state: “Examination of the diffusion of similar organizational 
strategies and structures should be a productive means for assessing the influence of elite interests.” 
However, when considering institutional evolution and variety, they also state (ibid, 158): “An 
understanding of the manner in which fields become more homogeneous would prevent policy 
makers and analysts from confusing the disappearance of an organizational form with its 
substantive failure. Current efforts to encourage diversity tend to be conducted in an organizational 
vacuum. Policy makers concerned with pluralism should consider the impact of their programs on 
the structure of organizational fields as a whole, and not simply on the programs of individual 
organizations. … Our approach seeks to study incremental change as well as selection. … The foci 
and motive forces of bureaucratization … have, as we argued, changed since Weber's time. But, the 
importance of understanding the trends to which he called attention has never been more 
immediate.” In regard to workers’ co-ops, Di Maggio and Powell’s remarks can imply that their 
limited diffusion is not necessarily the outcome of inefficiency, but of strong isomorphic pressure 
(including cultural and institutional marginalization) and of insufficient reformist action. As 
maintained in this paper, dedicated legislation and reform has the potential to uncover and exalt the 
positive potential of co-operative organization, while controlling for its weaknesses. 
The main outcome of this paper is based on the widespread empirical evidence showing that worker 
co-operative layoff much less than capitalist companies in both positive and negative economic 
conditions (among the most recent reports, Arando et al., 2010; Roelants et al., 2012; Borzaga, 
Carini, Tortia, 2019). The arguments developed lead to the consideration that, while in capitalist 
companies the possibility of the dismissal of the worker can never be excluded, the worker co-
operative has the potential to overcome this condition and to reach effective job protection for all 
worker members, up to the most extreme case in which dismissal is altogether excluded.  
5.2. Workers’ pressure power 
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One implication of the exclusion of members’ dismissal that has not been considered so far is that  
it is expected to increase worker members’ (the owners’) pressure on management compared to 
what observed in capitalist companies and in present day worker co-operatives. Not fearing 
dismissal, worker could feel comfortable with demanding excessively high wages and perquisites, 
inducing managers to concede too much in bilateral or collective bargaining, thus endangering the 
firm ability to invest and prosper. In general terms, since managers in worker co-ops are appointed 
by workers’ representatives, members’ pressure power can be expected to be all the more strong in 
this organization form. However, members’ job position and professional growth depend on the 
prosperity of the enterprise, which could be damaged by excessive concessions. Because of this, 
members’ demands and managers’ concessions are not expected to be excessive. Policies of 
financial sustainability (not necessarily of wage minimization) are expected instead.4 
5.3. Distributive fairness 
Additional crucial implications are distributive in nature. Historically, the need to keep labor 
income as egalitarian as possible across members and between members and managers pushed both 
individual co-operatives and groups of co-operatives to introduce caps on maximum wages, or caps 
on the ratio between maximum and minimum wage. Among the best known cases, the plywood co-
ops of US Pacific Northwest used to pay equal wages to all workers. The labor process was 
organized on the basis of job rotation schemes, and managerial positions were constrained to 
external, non-member workers (Craig and Pencavel, 1992, 1995). In the Mondragon group of co-
operatives in the Basque regions of Spain, right from its creation during the ‘50ies of last century, 
statutory bylaws have set the maximum attainable ratio between highest and lowest wage levels. 
The original ratio indeed one-to-three, but is has been modified overtime (Whyte and Whyte, 1991; 
Arando et al., 2012). Such provisions are understandable on the ground of the pursuit of equity and 
inclusion.  
The proposal in this paper is itself characterized by strong egalitarian connotation. Distributive 
equity is guaranteed by the two main rules that have been discussed so far: exclusion of involuntary 
                                                             
4 Stakeholder theory of capital structure maintains that privileged and firm specific relations with stakeholders (in our 
case workers) can lead the organization to concede better contractual terms to a specific stakeholder (in our case higher 
wages, and better on-the-job conditions), but, at the same time, is also likely to reduce expected cost of financing the 
organization (Titman, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988). That is, in order not to endanger job stability and working 
conditions for members, stakeholder oriented enterprises like worker co-ops would choose lower leverage, this way 
minimizing financial costs and expected costs of bankruptcy (Bae, Kang and Wang; 2011).  
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layoff, and minimum wage guaranteed to all worker members. All wage levels would need to be 
adjusted to account for the need to pay all workers (also the redundant ones), and to pay the 
minimum wage to all members. These rules imply strong egalitarian constraints, but do not exclude 
the possibility to increase remuneration above the minimum for the best performing and more 
experienced workers.  It is submitted that the presence of strong distributive constraints, even in the 
presence of freedom to adapt wages to desert and experience, would be sufficient guarantee of 
equitable distributive outcomes, and may not require addition constraints on the maximum ratio of 
the highest to the lowest wage level. 
This distributive solution can also be considered a close application of the Rawlsian maximin 
criterion (Rawls, 1971; 2001). Wages for the best performing workers can be increased only after 
the minimum wage is guaranteed to all workers, and wage increases can be interpreted, as in Rawls’ 
theory as being functional to guarantee the ability of the organization to at least satisfy the basic 
needs of all workers, and especially of those workers that would not find equivalent occupations in 
case the organization were closed and liquidated. To this end, the organization needs to survive and 
be competitive. That is, it needs to be able to recruit and retain high skilled workers by paying them 
adequately high wages. Efficient production would be guaranteed by remuneration of workers on 
the basis of desert.     
In Rawls theory, the maximin criterion of distribution is based on the difference principle, which 
states that inequality can be accepted only if it represents a necessary condition for furthering the 
position of the least well-off. This implies that inequality can be justified also in terms of efficiency, 
since only unequal distribution may result in maximum social welfare. The criterion is chosen by 
participating parties (in a contractarian perspective) in the original position, that is under the veil of 
ignorance, when these parties do not know their future wealth and position in society. This is the 
reason way the difference principle is chosen rationally, since in the presence of decreasing 
marginal utility to wealth, this principle minimizes the risk of the most negative outcomes for each 
and every individual in society. The application of the difference principle is subjected to the 
fulfillment of basic civil rights of freedom for everybody and fair equality of opportunity. In our 
application to worker cooperatives, the associative pact that underpins the creation of the 
cooperative can be equated Rawls’ original position, in which members of the cooperative have to 
define distributive patterns on the basis of procedural fairness criteria before actual distribution of 
takes place. It can be expected that members, whose preferences are informed by loss aversion, 
would minimize the risk of lay-off and would require that the co-operative satisfies at least their 
basic needs. To this end, they would restrict as much as possible the possibility of lay-off, or 
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exclude it altogether, and would require the co-operative to pay a minimum wage to all workers. 
The proposed solution are also coherent with Maslow’s (1943) theory of the hierarchy of needs, 
since the payment of a minimum wage to all workers would satisfy the most basic set of needs 
(survival), while the exclusion of layoffs would satisfy the second most basic needs layer (security), 
in the Maslowian scale.   
The setting of a minimum wage, beside guaranteeing the whole membership in times of crisis, 
would also allow overcoming the risk that any individual member or group of members is 
discriminated against in both positive and negative economic contingencies (cfr. the concept of a 
social minimum in Rawls and Altham, 1973, on the impossibility to adopt the lexicographic 
difference principle). Finally, the proposed solutions are not in contrast with the guarantee of the 
basic liberties to all workers, since each worker would freely choose to become an associate of a co-
operative and would retain the right to quit or switch to a different occupation.  
Several other competing explanations can be put forward to explain wage differentials in worker co-
operatives (individual liberty, since workers choose the occupation that pays them the most; 
efficient allocation of the labor input; remuneration of desert). However, the Rawlsian maximin 
criterion and difference principle as distributive principles appear to be applicable only to the social 
contracts underpinning associative forms of enterprise such as the worker co-operative. 
 
6. Discussion  
Critical remarks on the proposals of this paper can consider the fact that prohibitions (including 
prohibition of dismissal) carry with them the risk of inefficiencies and can give rise to elusive 
behaviors: if compressed by prohibitions and regulatory rigidity, economic forces take their revenge 
by bringing out under-the-counter agreements, black market and the like. 
The answer to this crucial critical arguments starts from observing that the main goal of the 
arguments in this paper is protect and increase workers' rights. The arguments highlight that rights 
in organizations can imply, besides the evident risk of inefficiencies, also relevant benefits in terms 
of increased welfare, and increased incentives to invest in human and organizational capital (e.g. 
firm specific social capital). Capitalistic enterprises need dismissals to maximize profit and 
shareholder value. Employment stability and maximization of shareholder value are two mutually 
exclusive objectives. Also, the contrasts of interest between property and workers require dismissal 
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as a threat against misbehavior (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Navarra and Tortia, 2014; Albanese et 
al., 2015, 2016). In the absence of the possibility to dismiss, worker would acquire too much 
contractual power, implying inefficiently low effort contribution, or to high demands for wage 
increases, which would reduce profits.  On the contrary, the overcoming of dismissals may be 
compatible with the nature and institutional structure of worker co-ops, because in their case 
workers are also owners, contrasting interests between ownership and workforce are absent, and the 
organization does not maximize profits. Bilateral opportunism is not fueled by contrasting interests 
and abuse of contractual. Asymmetric information can be more easily overcome(Ben-Ner, 1988; 
Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995).  Co-operatives di not maximize shareholder value and can use their 
reserves (locked assets) not only to make investments, but also as insurance funds to ensure job and 
income stability. In capitalism, profit stabilization contrasts with job and income stabilization.  
The proposal in this paper can be interpreted as the elaboration of a new "social technology" 
(Nelson and Sampat, 2000).5 The premise of this proposal is the incompatibility of an owner’s 
position with involuntary separation from his/her own job position in workers’ co-operatives. 
However, in reality layoffs are common practice in many worker co-ops in most countries. Labor 
contracts and labor relations in co-ops are similar in most respects to capitalist enterprises. Indeed, 
the expert jurists state that, in Italy, worker members of a co-op can undergo less employment 
protection than employees in capitalist firms (Jaeger, Denozza and Toffoletto, 2010), because the 
partner is interpreted as an entrepreneur, an independent worker, and therefore he or she can be 
considered dismissable at any time. Employees in capitalist companies, instead, benefit from union 
protection clauses. This way, systems of co-operative legislation appear to have reached a balance, 
trading-off easier dismissability with some additional managerial and control rights, which, 
however, in the presence of dismissal risk not to be effectively actualized. This balance risks to 
nullify the advantage that co-ops should enjoy over capitalist companies in terms of effective 
enforcement of workers’ rights and protection. At the same time the weaknesses of co-operative 
organization (e.g. limited access to financial markets; high organizational costs etc…) appear to 
cripple their development.    
Empirically, the data clearly show that worker co-ops layoff less than capital firms(Bartlett et al., 
1992; Craig and Pencavel, 1992, 1993; Bonin, Jones and Putterman, 1993; Pencavel, Pistaferri and 
                                                             
5 Cfr. also the concept of an institutions as habits of thought, in Veblen (1998), and as humanly devised collective action 
in control and liberation of individual action in Commons (1931, 1950). That is, constraints not only limit and guide 
individual action, but also allow its expansion and liberation.   
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Schiverdi, 2006; Burdin and Dean, 2009). However, this outcome is left to implicit contracting 
between firms and workers, not to legal or statutory enforcement. Members are dismissed less often 
than employees because the co-ops’ governance structure and worker involvement allows to 
preserve jobs better. The proposal in this paper is to be interpreted as a form of bolstering and 
institutionalization of already existing practice and would serve to definitively exclude the 
possibility of abuses against any co-op member, expanding workers’ rights and degree of liberty in 
the workplace.  
In broader terms, this kind of solution would go in the direction of reconciling socialist and liberal 
doctrines, conjugating freedom of exchange with workers’ rights inside organizations. The proposal 
is also coherent with constructivist streams in the social-liberal tradition, for example referring to 
well-known meanings of positive freedom, that is freedom that depends on the evolution of 
institutions and culture in liberal societies, as first initiated by Immanuel Kant and Isaiah Berlin 
(1969), and by Abraham Maslow (1943). In this sense, contrary to Robert Nozick (1974) and John 
Locke (1998) conception of negative freedom, liberty is a social, not natural construct, which 
depends on the rational deployment of human institutions with the aim of fulfilling human 
aspirations and needs. 
Risks of inefficiencies and distorted allocation of resources would be real. For example, incumbent 
members may induce newcomers to trade-off the constraints on dismissal with higher wages. Some 
workers may prefer to be paid more, than retaining the right not to be fired and be paid lower 
wages. However, if workers value job stability and the possibility to invest in the development of 
their human capital within the organization, the price of keeping workers dismissable in terms of 
higher labor costs may be exceedingly for the incumbents. Furthermore, cultural evolution can lead 
workers to consider the right to retain their job position as a personal and not alienable right, and to 
consider as unjust ideas and contractual solutions that violate the right of members to keep their 
jobs (Ellerman, 2016). Consequently, they would not accept to stay self-employed and work with 
the same firm for very long spans of time. Turnover costs would increase for the incumbents if the 
self-employed are not turned into members of the co-operative. That is, the monetization of 
dismissability in exchange for higher wages would be rejected at its very root in most cases.  
In this, the category of SEs may be interpreted as a residual category, but it can also be interpreted 
as simply that category of non-associated workers. The category of the SE fully accounts for those 
workers, who do not want or do not need job protection and seek to be independent (not to engage 
co-operative membership).  
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Other critical remarks highlight that dismissal must be admitted if decided by the majority of 
members, to counter breach of contractual duties (e.g. sabotage), low commitment or productivity. 
In the opposite case, it would not possible to discourage misbehavior and free riding. In the 
framework presented in this paper, the risk of misbehavior and free riding are not underscored. 
Taking free riding as paradigmatic example of misbehavior, the solution to this problem represents 
a necessary premise in any argument dealing with collective action in production and teamwork 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Putterman, 1988, 1993). The development of suitable working rules in 
control and sanctioning of defection, involvement in the governance and management of the 
organization, horizontal monitoring (e.g. peer pressure) and the economic incentive represented the 
need of the organization to be efficient in order to survive represent key elements for the 
overcoming of free riding in collective action. In the residual and proven cases of free riding, not 
committed workers can undergo closer scrutiny and, in the most extreme cases, dismissed. Also in 
this case, as stated, the absence of contrasting interests and of contractual power can favor cultural 
evolution in the direction of more collaborative and mutually beneficial attitudes, both on the side 
of workers and on the side of organizations, thus reducing the rate of misbehavior among workers 
and of abuse of power on the side of organizations.   
6.1. Employed and self-employed workers 
Several accounts of worker co-operative in the economic literature require that the incidence of 
employed workers is to be reduced to the minimum to prevent the possibility that an elite of worker 
owners controls and exploits large numbers of employed workers, leading to well-known 
phenomena of co-operative degeneration (Vanek, 1977; Screpanti, 2001, 2011). Some authors 
require that, in principle, a labor cooperative should takes on no employees, because this would be a 
situation in which the members behave as exploitative owners towards them; only mandate 
contracts with self-employed workers (lawyers, consultants etc.) who work voluntarily with 
different companies can be admitted. In this way, the employment relation would be definitely 
overcome (Screpanti, 2001, 2011).6 
This paper does not focus on the problem of the existence or non-existence of employed (non-
member) workers in worker co-operatives per se. However, given the strong constraints that the 
exclusion of dismissal would pose on incumbent members, one dominant consequence of the 
imposition of a strong EP would be that the co-operative restricts admission of new members by 
resorting to employed (non-member) workers. Either these workers are allowed to sign employment 
                                                             
6 The mandate contract is not an instance of the employment contract and does not generate an authority relation. 
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contracts as it happens in capitalist enterprises, or the employment relation is altogether overcome 
and these workers become self-employed under special contractual guarantees. Again, the creation 
of a wide category of self-employed workers may be a necessary outcome if the employment 
relation is to be overcome as proposed by some authors (Screpanti 2001, 2011).7 
The self-employed (SE) are interpreted as a category of workers that are neither members nor 
employees, who work on contracts that can also be open-ended (do not need to be short term). 
However, in the case of the self-employed, dismissal cannot be ruled out.  Co-ops themselves 
cannot be forced to turn all workers into partners. Forcing them to do so would violate their 
freedom of choice. Also, producing stable jobs requires investment and accumulation of capital. Co-
ops do not escape these constraints, they only interpret them differently. It may not possible to 
know how many stable jobs, bestowed with full membership rights, co-ops can produce at any 
moment in time. The risk that some worker remains on the side-lines and has to be contented with a 
more limited economic role cannot be underscored. Regulation and subsidies would be in charge of 
limiting the negative effects of contractual and market imperfections. 
The possibility of higher wages paid to the workers unwilling to be associated has already been 
discussed. As about those workers that are refused membership rights by co-operatives, this 
category can be constrained and limited by labor market regulation in several ways. It can be also 
granted additional contractual guarantees to eschew the risk of exploitation and abuse of power. 
However, it is unlikely to be completely eliminated.  
Protection offered by state labor legislation and unionization are obvious answers, together with the 
setting of a minimum wage. As highlighted in previous sections, a less obvious solution would be 
the liberalization of SE contractual relations, allowing the SE to work with different organizations 
at one and the same time. A second non-standard solution would be to allow the SE to associate and 
create new and independent worker co-ops while their contractual relation with existing co-ops are 
still in force. This latter right would contrast with the contractual position of employed workers in 
capitalist enterprises who, instead, are not allowed to create new organizationswithin the 
organization employing them. To do so, they first have to resign and then, as not-employed 
workers, create a new company. Increasing the width and depth of the SE’s contractual rights would 
                                                             
7 The features of the employment relation are well-known, starting at least from Coase (1937), and Simon (1959; cfr. 
Screpanti 2001, 2011). On the other hand, Theoretical and empirical research in law and economics are in charge of 
better defining the contractual nature and features of the category of the SE, and to measure relevant outcomes. 
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create indirect incentives for co-operatives to associate as many workers as possible and to turn the 
self-employed into members.   
As a final remark to this section, it is important to stress that, given the radical nature of the 
institutional mechanisms proposed in this paper, they are probably not applicable to all existing 
worker co-operatives, which were born and developed on very different institutional premises. The 
governance structure of existing co-ops may not be compatible with stringent EP regimes, 
especially concerning the exclusion of dismissal. Consequently, in the present stage of institutional 
evolution, the proposals in this paper can be endorsed on a voluntary basis by individual co-
operatives, especially by startups, but not imposed by law on all worker co-operatives. The law may 
not exclude the solution proposed, and may allow their introduction in statutory bylaws in 
individual co-operatives and groups, which would be in charge of endorsing such solutions. That is, 
we are dealing with one further legally backed option and with no legal obligation.    
 
7. Conclusion 
News concerning instances of exploitation, abuse of power and bad working conditions are, 
unluckily, not alien to worker co-operatives too. These facts point to the necessity to increase 
protection of workers’ rights and to better regulate managerial discretionary decisions.  
The exclusion of dismissal and the imposition of a minimum wage equal for all workers would 
radically change distributive patterns relative to what is observed in capitalist enterprises. Workers 
can be guaranteed a minimum wage equal for all to satisfy basic needs. The existence of a minimum 
wage does not exclude the possibility that the co-operative pays higher wages to more productive 
and experienced workers. In negative economic times, all wage levels in the coop can be reduced 
proportionally down to the level of the minimum wage. No member would be dismissed, but each 
member would be free to quit voluntarily when the wage falls below some critical subjective 
threshold. The ratio of the highest to the lowest wage cannot be defined ex-ante, since it depends on 
a long list of intervening causes, such as individual workers’ innate ability, effort contribution, the 
availability of outside options, firm dimension, sector of operation etc… Workers would quit the 
firm on a voluntary basis only, either because they have better opportunities (in other organizations 
or as self-employed) or because their wage becomes so low as to violate workers’ participation 
constraint. Predictably, wage dispersion would be much lower in co-operatives adopting the 
solutions proposed in this paper than in other co-ops not adopting them, and in capitalist enterprises. 
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Limited wage dispersion at the organizational level would imply lower economic inequality in 
society (Piketty, 2013).  
The radical configuration of these proposals (exclusion of dismissal and imposition of a minimum 
wage equal for all worker members) may not advise their application to all existing worker co-
operatives (different co-operatives can be characterized by substantially different managerial styles, 
governance settings, and path-dependent histories), but instead be opted for on a voluntary basis in 
statutory bylaws either by existing co-ops or by start-ups that choose retention of worker-members 
and job protection as one of their dominant values and objectives.  
Future research will be in charge of singling out in refined terms the (restrictive) conditions under 
which dismissal can still be applied to worker co-operatives, and the contractual regulation of the 
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